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Abstract 
 
Why are some wars longer than others? Offense-defense theorists have assumed that wars 
are shorter and it is more difficult for states to create security when military technology favors 
the offense and attacking is easier than defending. This study argues that this assumption is 
wrong on both accounts. First, statistical hazards models show that various measures of the 
offense-defense balance are not associated with war duration in the state system between 1817 
and 1992. Second, if wars are not shorter when offense is dominant, there should not be more 
rational incentives for decision-makers to start wars when offense has the advantage 
compared to when defending is relatively easier. 
The study develops the bounded learning theory to better understand the causes of war 
duration and tests it with four case studies. The theory argues that offense dominance is often 
so limited that it fails to guarantee that the enemy is swiftly run over, other things being equal. 
As a swift victory does not materialize with the help of offensive military technology and 
tactics, the process of finding a mutually acceptable negotiated solution to the war easily 
becomes long because of asymmetric information about expected offensive capacity and 
expansive ideology (asymmetric causal beliefs and offensive stakes). These variables make it 
unlikely that the combatants would quickly adjust their war aims so that they reflect their 
actual battlefield performance. As the combatants do not learn from the battlefield events, 
they cannot agree on their expected relative strength, which is necessary from a rational 
choice perspective for finding common ground for a peace treaty. 
Offense-defense theory specifies defense dominance as the prerequisite for more peaceful 
interstate relations. On the other hand, defense dominance is difficult to create as the realist 
self-help logic drives many states to continue developing offensive weapons technology. 
Furthermore, by assuming that wars are shorter during offense dominant eras, the offense-
defense theory creates false incentives for aggression. It is common sense that the risk of war 
does not increase when defense is dominant. However, even when attacking is relatively 
easier than defending, incentives for aggression should not increase on average if wars are not 
particularly short. Thus the study is a contribution to defensive realism. 
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